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Abstract 
Against the background of literature that assumes mutual exclusivity of European and 
Chinese access to African markets, this article conducted an assessment of European and 
Chinese exports to South Africa over the 2007-2018 period. Findings indicate that Chinese 
exports to South Africa have not supplanted total EU exports to South Africa, unlike the case 
with the country’s other previous leading trade partners; however, in this timeframe, China’s 
rate of growth has outgrown that of Europe, and some products which were principally 
sourced from the EU were subsequently exported more by the PRC, indicating that if the 
present trajectory continues, China will replace Europe as the principal export partner of 
South Africa within little over a decade. The onset of Brexit, with the UK being a key trade 
partner for South Africa within the EU, will expedite this trend by diminishing the gap 
between EU and PRC exports to South Africa. 
Keywords: EU-South Africa relations; China-South Africa relations; EU-China 
relations; Trade 
1. Introduction 
The period between 2000 and 2007 saw an exponential increase in China-Africa economic 
ties, which have subsequently grown in the decade since. These economic relations were 
especially heightened after the 2008 financial crisis. Overall, China-Africa trade grew by an 
average of 20 per cent per year to US$188-billion in the period between 2007 and 2018, with 
imports and exports more or less growing at the same pace, while Chinese foreign direct 
investment (FDI) into Africa grew by 40 per cent in the same timeframe.2 On the other hand, 
Europe was hit by the Great Recession, with economic growth declining in 2009 and 2012 
and its growth domestic product (GDP) growing on average by 0.982% while that of the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) grew by 8.597 % in the same timeframe (see Table 1). 
While the European Union (EU) accounts for a quarter of South Africa’s total trade in 
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contemporary terms, the number was higher at 40% in 2004,3 whereas China’s was lower and 
has been growing continuously from 7.6% in 2004 to 18% by 2018.4 Further, and perhaps 
because of these two inversely correlated trends, a litany of literature argues that due to 
historical and geostrategic reasons, the two entities are engaged in a state of competition with 
one another. Both actors are arguably capable of instrumentalizing their aid tethers to gain 
access to the African countries’ resources,5 as well as access to their import markets in 
somewhat of a zero-sum game. Against the background of literature that assumes mutual 
exclusivity of European and Chinese access to African markets, this article conducted an 
assessment of the EU (without Croatia as the country joined the supranational body in 2013, 
and the study begins in 2007) and China’s exports to South Africa to test a hypothesis of 
mutual growth and declines against inversely correlated growths and declines over the 2007-
2018 period. Specifically, the following hypotheses were tested: 
H1: All increases in PRC exports to the given country co-occur with decreases in EU 
exports of the given product in the given year(s); 
H2: No decreases in PRC and EU exports of the given product(s) to the given country 
in any given year(s) can mutually occur. 
The products traced for were those which had originally been principally dominated by the 
EU but which were subsequently overtaken by the PRC. These products were electric 
machinery and ceramic products. The research question, in this regard, was whether there 
were more incidences of mutual movement (either growth or decline) or inverse correlation. 
Findings indicate that EU exports of electrical machinery grew by a total of -20.798% 
overall, at 1.89% per year, whereas their Chinese counterparts grew by a total of 122.65% at 
a rate of 11.15% per year. On the other hand, EU exports of ceramic products grew by a total 
of 16.55% at a rate of 1.5% per year, while their Chinese counterparts grew by a total of 
134.86% at a rate of 12.26%. In terms of correlations, which could be positive (at close to 1) 
or inverse (at close to -1), South African changes in annual imports from both the EU and the 
PRC were correlated as follows: electrical machinery was correlated at 0.6547 and ceramic 
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products were inversely correlated at -0.2776. This indicates a moderate effect on both ends. 
However, total EU and PRC exports to South Africa grew mutually, with a 0.8407 correlation 
score, indicating more years of mutual growth than inversely correlated growth. However, the 
trend has been greater growth for the PRC than the EU; at 8.81% per year for China, and 
1.23% per year for the EU. 
The onset of Brexit, with the UK being a key trade partner for South Africa within the EU, 
will expedite this trend by diminishing the gap between EU and PRC exports to South Africa. 
That is, if we assume that the post-Brexit EU exports to South Africa will grow by 1.2% as 
they previously have, then we can deduce that, ceteris paribus, they will grow from 
US$25.273-billion to US$28.716-billion by 2031. On the other hand, Chinese exports, if they 
continue their growth trajectory of 96.966% observed over the 11-year period studied here 
will grow to US$32.17-billion by 2031. Even the inclusive EU total, ceteris paribus, would be 
US$31.86-billion in the same time frame. 
The second section of the paper will give a brief literature review, surveying the body of 
work on the effects, outcomes and dynamics of EU and Chinese relations with Africa and 
South Africa in particular, and some of the literature which has emerged arguing that the two 
entities are engaged in competition for influence and sustainability at each other’s expense. 
The third section will give an account of the methodology to be used in the paper, followed 
by a description of the dataset in the fourth section. The fifth will give an analysis of the data. 
The sixth section will subsequently note some insights and possible implications which can 
be reached on the basis of the data analyzed. The article then concludes by noting some areas 
for further study. 
2. Literature 
The relations between the EU and South Africa are based on the Trade, Development and 
Cooperation Agreement (TDCA). The TDCA covers 3 pillars, including trade, development 
aid and cooperation in economic and social cooperation. 
The significance of the special and reinforced relationship between the EU and SA was 
consolidated with the establishment of a Strategic Partnership signed in 2007, one of the ten 
in the World and the only one the EU has with an African country.6 
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The purpose of this Strategic Partnership status is to bolster ‘political dialogue’ as well as 
‘pursue strategic cooperation and shared objectives with regard to regional, African and 
global issues on the one hand, and stronger policy dialogue and sectoral cooperation.’7 The 
Strategic Partnership also serves as a mechanism for annual summits between the two 
entities.8 Economically, the EU is South Africa’s principal trade and investment partner, 
representing some 25% of its trade and 75% of its FDI. This results in direct employment of 
an estimated 500, 000 people.9 Nevertheless, this number used to be higher, with European 
exports to South Africa accounting for 40% of its imports, and 30% of its exports.10 It was 
against this background that the authors argued concluded their 2004 book The European 
Union and South Africa, by noting that ‘the EU-South Africa relationship is sound and 
flourishing.’11 
In a 2019 EU-South Africa investment summit, EU Ambassador to South Africa, Riina 
Kionka, sought to convey the same mood, observing that: 
the European Union has been a stable and resilient partner of South Africa through the 
toughest times. While South African exports in 2018 have decreased by 3.1 percent overall, 
due mainly to strong declines in the United States (-13.5 percent) and China (-9 percent), 
South Africa’s exports to the EU have increased by 2.8 percent. This comprises almost one 
quarter of this country’s total exports. This is a testament to our preferential agreement, the 
Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA), which provides stability and predictability to our 
trading and business environment and is an anchor for our investment decisions.12 
Nevertheless, South Africa’s foreign policy, much like (and indeed because of) the domestic 
order of the country took a divergence in 1994, with the coming into power of the country’s 
first black government under the leadership of Nelson Mandela. Thus ‘South Africa’s foreign 
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policy has evolved through various presidents.’13 Furthermore, and more to the point of this 
article, scholars of South African foreign policy observe that ‘since the dawn of democracy 
there has also been a gradual shift from a foreign policy that exhibited strong normative 
expressions, inclined to the West, to a more pragmatic foreign policy that is aligned with the 
new rising powers.’14  
Under President Zuma, foreign policy was aligned more and more towards China and Russia. 
‘These countries would be given more attention at a bilateral level, especially in diplomatic 
and commercial relations.’15 In this regard it is noted that Russia was a high priority, 
receiving more visits by the South African president than any other country. Furthermore, the 
ruling ANC ‘has cemented party-to-party relations with both Vladimir Putin’s United Russia, 
despite its right-leaning credentials, and the Communist Party of China.’16 
This fact has been embraced by a large section of the foreign policy community, with Qobo 
and Dube noting that the trade with the eastern world ‘is active in shaping the development 
agenda with like-minded countries.’17 Others, when looking at South Africa’s trade with 
China, find it to be lopsided. Mutambara’s work suggests that 
South Africa continues to benefit more from trade with its long standing trading partners than 
it does with China. Trade with China merely provides South Africa a market mainly for non-
fuel primary commodities, while the traditional trading partners provide markets for both low 
value and high value added products and opportunities for intra-industry trade. This is 
essential for innovation and technology spillovers both of which are essential to help South 
Africa to develop its manufacturing base further.18 
For its part, the South African government would like to think of both players as important to 
its economic growth. South Africa’s president Cyril Ramaphosa’s strong commitment to 
building a new social compact around investment makes the EU and China both central to its 
economic diplomacy; as without FDI ‘the country cannot grow above 2%, as National 
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Treasury has systematically warned,’ floating a new investment target of US$100-billion 
between 2019 and 2024.19 
It is evidently not lost on Brussels that China’s growth trajectory is exponential and could at 
some point rival its own. ‘Since the early 2000s the African continent has become an 
increasingly important arena for both traditional donors including the EU and emerging 
powers including China.’20 This coincided with China’s growing GDP, and its trade and 
overseas investment, and not necessarily as part of a grand plan to oust the West.21 But 
growth carries many implications, regardless of intentions. Graham Allison’s semi-
deterministic argument in his 2017 opus Destined for War: Can America and China Escape 
Thucydides's Trap? is based on this assumption. As he words it: ‘intentions aside, when a 
rising power threatens to displace a ruling power, the resulting structural stress makes a 
violent clash the rule, not the exception.’22 China’s own growth came as a shock to the 
leaders of the EU, ‘suggesting that they failed to respond to China’s rise as an emerging 
donor in Africa.’23 Shock was followed by reaction, however. ‘To deal with the increasing 
presence of China on the African continent, eventually in October 2008 the [European] 
Commission launched the EU-China-Africa trilateral cooperation initiative. However, no 
concrete joint development projects have so far seen the light.’24 It perhaps is because of this 
kind of thin evidence for cooperation between China and Europe on the continent that 
observers of both actors see them as being locked in competition, particularly over Africa.25 
Europe too is arguably a site of contestation between China and the EU: 
China, it seems, has big plans in Europe. After a six-day jaunt through Italy, Monaco, and 
France, Chinese President Xi Jinping walked away with an agreement from the Italian 
government to join China’s massive global economic project, the Belt and Road Initiative. 
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Washington and Brussels were furious. Earlier that month, the European Union had published 
its new China strategy, which characterized China as a ‘systemic rival.’ At an EU-China 
summit scheduled for April 9, all these tensions may come to a head.26 
In 2014, the year after Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was launched, the EU launched its own 
‘infrastructure stimulus plan’ and was eager for Chinese participation in the projects. 
Currently, however, some argue that Europe is ‘doing nearly everything it can to keep the 
money out; just a few months ago, the EU even shoved through a new, tougher screening 
mechanism to make it harder for Chinese investment to flow in.’27 This was in reference to 
an initiative by the German, French, and previous Italian governments, who had issued a 
letter ‘requesting the European Commission redraw the rules on foreign investment in the 
EU’  due to ‘concerns in the EU that Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) has an 
underlying political motive were intensified just before the letter was submitted, with 2016 
seeing the largest amount of Chinese FDI in the EU ever – 17 times the amount received in 
2010.’28 
The complex relationship between the two entities has led to numerous studies. For example, 
noting that ‘embracing theoretical perspectives on EU foreign policy (EUFP) making 
contributes to a better understanding of its complicated policy-making process,’ Hooijmaajers 
makes the case for ‘incorporating multiple conceptual lenses.’29 Particularly, the study  
demonstrates that institutionalism contributes to a better understanding of every distinct stage of 
the policy process regarding the EU-China-Africa trilateral cooperation initiative. Aspects of 
neorealism illuminate some stages of the policy process as well, while BPM [bureaucratic process 
model] is only applicable to a limited degree.30 
This study seeks to contribute to the literature using South Africa as a case study. 
3. Methods 
This article tested a hypothesis postulating that increases in the PRC’s exports of given 
products to South Africa in any given year(s) between 2007 and 2018 would always correlate 
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with decreases in EU exports (excluding Croatia as the country joined the EU in 2013, and 
the study begins in 2007). Each country’s product set was chosen on the basis of the products 
being primarily imported from the EU in the initial year of study, and subsequently seeing 
Chinese growth between then and 2018. The research question, in this regard, was: are there 
were more incidences of mutual movement (either growth or decline) or inverse correlation? 
The data was sourced from a publicly available dataset produced and annually curated by the 
United Nations and the World Bank. 
The postulated causal mechanism in this study are the differentiated growth rates of the EU 
and China as well as China’s foreign policy in the 2000s, which has seen it increasingly 
trained towards Africa. The former is evinced by differential GDP growth rates of the two 
countries in the period, as represented in Table 1. 
Table 1: PRC and EU GDP growth rates, 
2007-2018 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data sourced from World Bank. 
These causal mechanisms, in combination, provide basis to postulate a growth in Chinese 
interest in the Chinese market. Further, the former points towards a potential causal pathway 
through which China could be poised to extract a comparative advantage vis-à-vis the EU in 
African markets for growth (in relative terms). 
  
 PRC GDP 
growth rate (in 
%) 
European Union GDP 
growth rate (in %) 
2007 14.2 3.049 
2008 9.6 0.516 
2009 9.2 -4.315 
2010 10.6 2.168 
2011 9.5 1.791 
2012 7.9 -0.423 
2013 7.8 0.265 
2014 7.3 1.739 
2015 6.9 2.353 
2016 6.7 0.039 
2017 6.9 2.598 
2018 6.567 2.015 
Totals 103.16 11.795 
Average 8.597 0.982 
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3.1.Caveats 
It is worth noting that the two products studied in this study are not necessarily the top two 
products which these countries export to South Africa. Neither are they necessarily the top 
products which South Africa imported from the EU or China. Instead, its three principal 
imports from China included electrical machinery and equipment (valued at US$3.060-billion 
in 2018), machinery and mechanical appliances (valued at US$2.326-billion in 2018), and 
furniture (totaling  US$813.8-milion in 2018), and from the EU these were machinery 
(valued at US$5.719-billion in 2018), vehicles other than railway or tramway rolling stock, 
and parts and accessories thereof (valued at US$5.196-billion in 2018). The third product set 
included electrical machinery (valued at US$2.643-billion at in 2018). This product also 
happens to match the criteria for being studied here (i.e., having been principally exported by 
the EU and subsequently being surpassed by China). 
4. Data 
This section introduces and graphically represents the dataset to be utilised to test the 
hypotheses. 
 
Data sourced from UN Trade Map. 
Figure 1 represents EU and Chinese exports to South Africa over the 2007-2018 period. At 
the beginning of the set, EU exports started at US$27.983 billion, peaked at US$36.55-billion 
in 2011. By 2018, the exports were at US$28.048. On the other hand, Chinese exports began 
at US$7.444 and continued to grow until 2014, recovered once more from 2015, declined 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
EU 27,983 30,945 22,52 28,458 36,55 33,607 32,342 30,709 27,623 25,058 27,164 28,048
PRC 7,444 8,617 7,365 10,799 13,362 15,323 16,83 15,699 15,857 12,849 14,808 16,337
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
Years 
Figure 1: Total exports to South Africa (in billions of US$) 
EU PRC
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again in 2016 and grew to their peak of US$16.337 in 2018. Interestingly, the EU’s exports to 
South Africa had a negative growth of -5.049% between 2013 and 2014, when Croatia joined 
and expanded the EU. Additionally, in 2016, the year of the Brexit referendum, there was a 
decline of -9.28% in EU exports to South Africa. However, Chinese exports saw an even 
larger decline of -18.96%. 
Data sourced from UN Trade Map. 
Figure 2 represents the data on EU and PRC exports of electrical machinery exports to South 
Africa over the 2007-2018 period. EU exports started at a base of US$3.667-billion in 2007, 
grew and peaked at US$3.906-billion in 2011, and subsequently declined each year to their 
2018 (and dataset) low of US$2.643-billion. On the other hand, PRC exports of the same 
product set to South Africa began at US$1.223-billion in 2007, and grew each consecutive 
year  until peaking at US$3.031-billion in 2015. The exports then once again started 
recovering from 2016 onwards and closed at US$3.06-billion by 2018. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
3,667 3,654 2,673 3,113 3,906 3,609 3,685 2,908 2,929 2,632 2,626 2,643
1,223 1,688 1,311 1,99 2,221 2,076 2,989 2,856 3,031 2,448 2,806 3,06
0
0,5
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1,5
2
2,5
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3,5
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4,5
Figure 2: Electrical machinery exports to South Africa (in billions of 
US$) 
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Figur
e 3 
repre
sents the data on EU and PRC exports of electrical machinery exports to South Africa over 
the 2007-2018 period. EU exports started at a base of US$0.174-billion in 2007, and grew to 
US$0.216-billion in 2008, before declining in 2009 and 2010, and once again in 2012, and 
from 2015 to 2016. Afterwards, the exports recovered in 2017 and 2018, closing at 
US$0.173-billion in 2018. On the other hand, PRC exports grew from an initial base of 
US$0.107 and grew to overtake their EU counterparts in 2012. For their part, Chinese exports 
went through declines from 2014 to 2016, and saw a recovery from 2017 onwards (closing at 
US$0.286-billion by 2018). 
5. Analysis 
This section assesses the outcomes for each product set by converting each year-on-year 
growth/decline into percentages and then conducting a regression analysis (where the overall 
score should be closer to -1 if the two exporters have grown at each other’s expense and 
closer to 1 if their growth is mutual). 
5.1. Electrical machinery 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
EU 0,174 0,216 0,182 0,181 0,224 0,158 0,173 0,193 0,166 0,138 0,147 0,173
PRC 0,107 0,115 0,133 0,178 0,208 0,351 0,413 0,275 0,261 0,216 0,237 0,286
0
0,05
0,1
0,15
0,2
0,25
0,3
0,35
0,4
0,45
Figure 3: Ceramic products to South Africa (in billions of US$) 
EU PRC
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Data sourced from UN Trade Map. Calculations by author. 
For exports of electrical machinery, we find that the value of R is 0.6547. This indicates a 
moderate positive correlation; there is a tendency for high EU exports to South Africa to 
coincide with PRC exports to South Africa, and vice versa. The same holds for decreases of 
the same product. The p-value is .02087, and thus the result is significant at p < .05. 
5.2. Ceramic products 
 
Data sourced from UN Trade Map. Calculations by author. 
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Figure 4: Changes in exports of electrical machinery to South 
Africa (in %), 2007-2018 
EU PRC
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Figure 5: Changes in exports of ceramic products to South 
Africa (in %), 2007-2018 
EU PRC
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For exports of electrical machinery, we find that the value of R is -0.2776. Although 
technically a negative correlation, the relationship between the two export volumes is only 
weak. Further, the p-value is .383417 and thus the relationship is not significant at p < .05. 
5.3. Total exports 
 
Data sourced from UN Trade Map. Calculations by author. 
In terms of total exports to South Africa by both the EU and the PRC, the value of R is 
0.8407. This is a strong positive correlation, which indicates that high scores of EU exports 
go with high PRC exports and vice versa. The p-value is .000614 and thus the result is 
significant at p < .05. 
6. Discussion: Findings and implications 
For the first hypothesis (all increases in PRC exports to the given country co-occur with 
decreases in EU exports of the given product in the given year(s)), we find that there were no 
such occurrences for electrical machinery, but 7 for ceramic products (2008, 2009, 2011, 
2012, 2013, 2014 and 2015) all but one (i.e., in 2011) of which were in favor of China. On 
the more threshold-sensitive second hypothesis (i.e., no decreases in PRC and EU exports of 
the given product(s) to the given country in any given year(s) can mutually occur), we find 
that since there were incidents of mutual decline (in 2008, 2009, and 2012 overall), it does 
not hold. Therefore, we can conclude that the exports have no direct effect on one another 
and growth for Chinese exports into South Africa does not necessarily mean decline for the 
EU’s own. 
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Figure 6: Changes in total annual exports to South Africa  
(in %), 2007-2018 
EU PRC
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Findings indicate that EU exports of electrical machinery grew by a total of -20.798% 
overall, at 1.89% per year, whereas their Chinese counterparts grew by a total of 122.65% at 
a rate of 11.15% per year. On the other hand, EU exports of ceramic products grew by a total 
of 16.55% at a rate of 1.5% per year, while their Chinese counterparts grew by a total of 
134.86% at a rate of 12.26%. In terms of correlations, which could be positive (at close to 1) 
or inverse (at close to -1), South African changes in annual imports from both the EU and the 
PRC were correlated as follows: electrical machinery was correlated at 0.6547 and ceramic 
products were inversely correlated at -0.2776. This indicates a moderate effect on both ends. 
However, total EU and PRC exports to South Africa grew mutually, with a 0.8407 correlation 
score, indicating more years of mutual growth than negative. However, the trend has been 
greater growth for the PRC than the EU; at 8.81% per year for China, and 1.23% per year for 
the EU. 
Findings indicate a number of implications. Firstly, it is foreseeable that Chinese exports to 
South Africa have not supplanted total EU exports to South Africa, unlike with the country’s 
other previous trade partners (particularly the US, Japan and Taiwan and the individual EU 
countries, such as the UK and France); however, in this timeframe, its rate of growth has 
outgrown that of Europe, indicating that if the present trajectory continues, China will replace 
Europe as the principal export partner of South Africa. The onset of Brexit will also mean 
that the EU’s total weight of trade with South Africa (along with its total FDI) will be 
marginally decreased as Britain extricates itself from the supranational body. This is not an 
insignificant amount. In fact, when the UK is excluded from the EU total, its exports are 
reduced from US$28.048-billion to US$25.273-billion. This decreases the gap between China 
and the EU-27’s exports to South Africa to less than US$10-billion. 
A second implication of the study is the necessity of consideration of the underlying aspects 
of the political relationship between South Africa and the two export partners since the 
question under consideration is South African purchases of either one’s exports. In this 
regard, the PRC would appear to have an advantage, due to the growing soft power of China 
among political elite in the country, including within the ranks of its governing African 
National Congress party. Indeed, China may already be garnering resentment and may 
increasingly so: 
The South African public’s skepticism about China’s intentions can be explained by two main 
factors. First, many South Africans believe that China interferes in their country’s internal 
affairs by providing financial assistance to the ANC. These suspicions surfaced after the 2009 
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national elections, when South African opposition parties accused the ANC of accepting 
campaign contributions from Chinese donors. These donations have been linked to South 
Africa’s unwillingness to criticize China’s human rights record in major multilateral forums 
like the African Union, the UN Security Council, and the G20.31 
Secondly, 
the ANC’s critics believe that China’s model of governance has influenced South Africa in a 
negative way. During Zuma’s tenure as president of South Africa from 2009-2018, some 
opposition activists alleged that Zuma was modelling the ANC after the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) to prolong the party’s political hegemony.32 
Such claims sprang up once more when the ruling party’s Secretary General, Ace Magashule, 
stated on July 30th 2018 that the CPC would give training to ANC members prior to the then 
upcoming May 2019 national elections.33 The criticism was not only external, however, as 
after Magashule made his announcement, Fikile Mbalula, himself a member of the ANC 
national executive committee, claimed that through such a programme ‘China was 
encouraging ANC members to engage in propaganda that is typically associated with 
authoritarian states.’34 Furthermore, ‘as Zuma was widely criticized for reducing government 
transparency and diluting the South African constitution to advance ANC interests, many 
South African civil society activists view the growth of Chinese influence over South Africa 
as a trigger for further democratic breakdown, and have become increasingly hostile toward 
Beijing.’35 
In addition to this, the EU has more tangible and measurable advantage as it is the principal 
investor, with Chinese investment in South Africa being less than satisfactory according to 
many scholars, government officials and the Chinese Ambassador to South Africa.36 On the 
other hand, the EU’s FDI advantage only carries relevance provided the supranational 
organisation manages to maintain its cooperative behaviour. This comes at a time when the 
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EU is challenged both from the outside by Russia – as well as by the United States – and 
from within by the likes of Britain and increasingly Hungary and Poland, under their populist, 
right-leaning governments. 
Furthermore, not operating in a global vacuum, the EU has arguably had to be more 
cognizant of the actions of other major players on the global stage. For example, Vassilis 
Ntousas argues that ‘amid an escalating Sino-American rivalry, there is a growing realization 
in Brussels that something has to change in the way the EU thinks and acts internationally.’37 
Furthermore, the same author argues that “if the EU aspires to be a more assertive global 
player, it will need to grow comfortable with…compartmentalization. For example, if 
Brussels wants to stand up to Beijing regarding human rights, the South China Sea or issues 
of acquisition of European infrastructure, this should not mean that cooperation on areas such 
as peacekeeping, arms control or climate change needs to be blocked.”38 Ironically, among 
the PRC’s antagonists within the EU is the member state with which it is most economically 
linked within the collective; Germany: 
Starting around 2004, economic links between Germany and China had helped propel the 
German economy through one of its best periods in living memory, building a more stable 
international order in the process. A year later, the mood had already changed. Politicians and 
officials were starting to hear alarm bells coming from German industry. German companies 
were starting to feel the heat as their technological edge evaporated and they lost contracts to 
major Chinese competitor.39 
For South Africa, the challenges and opportunities may come in balancing its pursuit of 
markets in commitments with both China and the EU as a collective, which also contains 
Germany, an EU member who also happens to be individually among South Africa’s top 
trade partners. 
7. Conclusion 
In conclusion, the study indicates a general lack of zero-sum game overall as the two 
exporters’ total exports into South Africa have no direct impact on one another. The findings 
of the article point to the lack of a general replacement of the EU by the PRC in all exports in 
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the period between 2007 and 2018; however, the PRC did surpass the EU to become the 
principal exporter of electrical machinery (as of 2015) and ceramic products (as of 2012). 
This means that on a year-on-year basis, there were instances of mutual growth of European 
imports to South Africa with those of China, but on the decade-long timeframe, there has 
been an overall surpassing of the EU by the PRC in these specific products, which had 
originally been dominated by the EU. 
While EU presently accounts for a quarter of South Africa’s total trade in contemporary 
terms, this number had previously been higher, at 40% in 2004, whereas China’s was lower 
and has been growing continuously from 7.6% in 2004 to 18% by 2018.40 This is an 
indication that if the present trajectory continues, China will replace Europe as the principal 
export partner of South Africa within little over a decade. The onset of Brexit, with the UK 
being a key trade partner for South Africa within the EU, will expedite this trend by 
diminishing the gap between EU and PRC exports to South Africa. That is, if we assume that 
the post-Brexit EU exports to South Africa will grow by 1.2% as they previously have, then 
we can deduce that, all other things being equal, they will grow from US$25.273-billion to 
US$28.716-billion by 2031. On the other hand, Chinese exports, if they continue their growth 
trajectory of 96.966% observed over the 11-year period studied here will grow to US$32.17-
billion by 2031. 
Further studies could shine a light on the impact of Brexit on the differential access to the 
South African market between China and the EU, especially so given that the UK, in pursuit 
of ‘Global Britain’, could seek to gain a closer relationship with the PRC.41 There also 
remains a persistent need for a theoretical framing of the relationship that African countries 
has with the numerous and evidently widening number of external players on the continent, 
especially as the continent itself emerges and gains economic momentum. This will require 
empirically-based accounts that move beyond the persistent narratives that give little to no 
agency to many African countries in their external relations; this is no longer the case, at least 
for African countries such as Angola, Ethiopia and South Africa (given its exclusive status as 
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the EU’s only Strategic Partner in the continent).42 Typological models in this regard can 
illustrate the different impacts not only of the external partners but also how these are 
modulated by the circumstances on the continent. 
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